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HUMAN RIGHTS AND
UGANDA'S EXPULSION OF ITS ASIAN MINORITY
I. BACKGROUND
On August 5, 1972, Major General Idi Amin Dada Oumee
ordered all Ugandans of Asian descent out of the country within
three months, accusing them of "sabotaging the economy."'
Most of the Asians are of Indian or Pakistani origin and have
resided in Uganda for generations. They control 90 percent of
Uganda's commerce and trade. They comprise 80 percent of the
doctors, lawyers and teachers.2
Of the 309,000 Asians living in East Africa, over one-third
are British subjects.3 These people have either preferred to re-
main British subjects because of the travel and educational ad-
vantages, or they have inadvertently forgotten to renounce their
British citizenship.
Immediately after the expulsion decree was issued the
British acknowledged "special responsibility" for the Asians in
Uganda who held British passports.4 Noting Britain's moral and
legal duty to absorb the ousted Asians, Sir Alec Douglas-Hume
observed that
If these people were ever expelled we (the British Government)
accepted an obligation to take them in. To go back on that would
be to break the word solemnly given of successive British Gov-
ernments. But it's not only a matter of the British Government's
word. Under international law a state has a duty to accept those
of its nationals who have nowhere else to go.
5
Many of the Asians living in Uganda, however, claimed
Ugandan citizenship. The government demanded that they fur-
nish documentary evidence, such as a birth certificate or docu-
ments renouncing any previous citizenship, to substantiate their
claim.6 The citizenship certificates of those Asians unable to
do so were cancelled, and they became stateless.
7
1 N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1972, at 9, col. 1. Foreign Minister Kcbeki claimed the
Asians were charging exorbitant prices and illegally exporting funds
from the country. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1972, at 2, col. 7.
2 N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
3 N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
4 N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1972, at 6, col. 1.
5 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1972, at 3, col. 6.
"N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1972, at 4, col. 4.
7 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1972, at 3, col. 4. Also Britain's envoy to Uganda and
European Economic Council Representative, Geofrey Rippon, reported
that citizenship papers were torn up at random by Ugandan officials.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1972, at 8, col. 1.
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Amin banned all air shipments of Asians' possessions for
fear they would ship expensive goods instead of complying with
currency regulations. Amin's minister of Commerce, Wilson Lu-
tera, stated that the government would buy the property and sell
it to Africans." No mention was made of the amount of repara-
tion to be paid. The British reported that the first Ugandans
arriving in Britain had been stripped of all their possessions.
Army troops confiscated their remaining belongings as the
expellees approached the airport to departY
The Asians were allowed 48 hours to leave the country
after receiving exit papers. To insure compliance, Amin or-
dered a house to house search without warrant.'0 The order
authorized troops and prison officials to arrest any person sus-
pected "on reasonable grounds of having committed or being
about to commit an offense against property, a person or public
order.""
On September 14, Amin announced that any Asians left after
November 8 would be put into camps by the army. Amin was
later quoted by Ugandan radio as having no intention of ex-
tending this deadline;1 2 however, he did express in a letter to
U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim that "it is not my intention
to treat or otherwise oppress any non-citizen Asian who might
have failed to meet the deadline.' 3 This statement later proved
to be untrue, and Asians were detained in camps after the de-
parture date had expired.
II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND ALIENS
The failure of traditional international law to provide
mechanisms for protecting individual rights has often been
noted. How these rights can be protected within the domestic
sphere of a sovereign state remains a dilemma exemplified by
the Ugandan situation. 4
Basic to the protection of human rights is the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, which proposes that "each state
has a legal duty to see that conditions prevailing within its own
8 N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 2, col. 5.
9 N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1972, at 8, col. 5. See also report in N.Y. Times, Sept.
30, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
10 Time, Oct. 16, 1972, at 34.
11 N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1972, at 5, col. 1.
12 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 13, col. 1.
13 N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, at 13, col. 1.
14 Professor McDougal has expressed the belief that whatever values we
summarize as "human rights," however narrowly or broadly, are with
equal obvicusness dependent upon "security" and all other values. Mc-
Dougal and Bebr, Human Rights in the Uinted Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 607 (1964) [hereinafter cited as McDougal and Bebr].
STUDENT COMMENT
territory do not menace international peace and order, and
[that] to this end it must treat its own populace in a way
which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice or
shock the conscience of mankind."' 5 Although its original pur-
pose was to protect -individuals and groups from their own
state, the doctrine has been expanded to sanction the use of
external force "in cases in which a State maltreats its sub-
jects,"'16 and to "require of each state a minimum protection of
all inhabitants of its territory."' 7
A denial of justice allows an international claim of a vio-
lation of human rights, or "some unlawful violation of the
rights of an alien."' 8 Interestingly, international law has de-
veloped more complex protection for aliens than for citizens. 19
Professor Lauterpacht has noted:
Although international law does not at present recognize, apart
from treaty, any fundamental rights of the individual protected
by international society as against the state of which he is a
national, it does acknowledge some of the principle fundamental
rights of the individual in one particular sphere, namely, in
respect of aliens . . .The result, which is somewhat paradoxical,
is that the individual in his capacity as an alien enjoys a larger
measure of protection by international law than in his character
as the citizen of his own state. 20
There is substantial agreement that there is an "inter-
national standard of civilized justice" requiring local leaders
to protect aliens crossing national and local boundaries. 21 That
standard would apply to the status of the Asians in Uganda.
Since they have been deported as aliens, their rights in that
country should have been interpreted accordingly by the in-
ternational community. As long as a "vigorous minority,"
22
however, demands that "equality of treatment" be the only
international standard, 23 aliens will be offered the same small
protection given to nationals.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Article 55(c) of the United Nations Charter states that
"the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for,
15 38 AM. J. INT'L. L. Supp. 41-135 (1944); cited in McDougal and Bebr.
16 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN 32 (1950).
17 AM. J. INT'L. L. SuPP., supra note 15.
18BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD, passim,
(1915).
19 AM. J. INT'L. L. SuPP., supra note 15, at 609.
20 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 16, at 121.
21 BoRcHARD, supra. note 18, at intro. Soe also McDougal and Bebr at 610.
2 AM. J. INT'L. L. SuPP., supra note 15, at 610.
2. J. ROTH, MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS
23 (1949); see also C. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 47 (1931).
110 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 3
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all . . ." Article 56 adds: "All Members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Or-




The two provisions taken together have been interpretated
to create definite legal obligations. But since the legal obliga-
tion is very general, the U.N. has supplemented the Charter by
adopting covenants which provide more substantive content
and outline some specific enforcement procedures. Additionally,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights25 has given com-
prehensive substance to human rights. While the Declaration is
not a legal instrument, some of its provisions expound general
principles of law. Perhaps its greatest significance is that it
provides an authoritative guide to the interpretation of the
provisions in the Charter.
26
In most instances however, the U.N. has not been able
to do much about actual violations of human rights and, in fact,
has frequently ignored them. There exists, consequently, no
generally applicable and systematic international procedures or
institutional machinery for receiving and investigating com-
plaints for individual petitioners.
The first step in giving the individual substantial remedies
for violations of human rights is to recognize him as a subject
of international law. One is a subject of international law when
he has "rights under international rules of conduct which he
can enforce by seeking relief before a tribunal, whether or not
domestic law would enforce such a right.
'27
Professor McDougal aptly describes the protection of the
individual through the state of nationality as a "fiction": the
wrong done to the individual is a wrong done to the national
state and international law imposes no duty on the nation state
24 United Nations Charter, set forth at 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. See
also Articles 62, 68 & 76 for further provisions on human rights. Two
cases point out that when private individuals tried to invoke Articles
55 and 56 in a domestic setting, relief was denied because the Charter
was interpreted as not being a "self-executing" treaty, and, therefore,
not binding on private citizens of the United States without some
domestic legislation. See Fujui v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617
(1952), and Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa
147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953).
25 U.N. Doc. No. A/811 (1948).
'6 Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 RECUEIL DES
COURs 5, 198-99 (1962). See, e.g., Nanda, A Critique of the United Na-
tions Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DENVER L.J. 53 (1972).
27 Tucker, Has the Individual Become a Subject of International Law?, 34
U. OF CIN. L. REV. 345 (1965).
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to prosecute such claims.28
Thus, rights of the individual have not been widely recog-
nized. Indeed, only the European Court of Human Rights grants
the right of "individual petition. '2 Ugandan Asians, therefore,
must qualify under other international provisions, not as indi-
viduals seeking petition, but as racial minorities appealing to
other mechanisms for protection of their rights as aliens.
IV. REGIONAL SOLUTION
The eradication of colonialism, of racial discrimination and
of apartheid are issues on which African leaders have always
stood firmly united, and along these lines a regional solution
may be found to situations like Uganda's. 30 The Resolution on
Apartheid and Racial Discrimination expresses "the unanimous
conviction of the imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating
and intensifying efforts to put an end to the South African
Government's criminal policy of apartheid and wipe out racial
discrimination in all its forms.3 '
The Organization of African Unity Charter 2 provides that
by adherance to the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, "the Heads of State and Government set forth
a code of behavior for African States in their mutual relation-
ship, elaborated in Article 3 of the Charter and based on re-
spect for sovereignty and territorial integrity in inter-African
affairs."33 It should be noted that nowhere in the O.A.U. Charter
is it stated that certain purposes are primary, and that, by
exclusion, others are secondary.
3 4
Regional arrangements in Africa have already been initiated.
In 1961 in Lagos a conference, organized by the International
Commission of Jurists, created the "Law of Lagos" which states
that a proposed convention should provide for "the creation
of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that recourse thereto
should be made available to all persons under the jurisdiction




As the European experience has shown, standards and ap-
proaches that entail relatively minimum obligations can be
gradually expanded as fears of abuses lessen. On a local level,
28 AM. J. INT'L. Supp., supra note 15, at 610.
29) 2 Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 174 (1957-58).
30 j. CERVENKA, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRIcAN UNIrY AND ITS CHARTER 1
(1965).
31 Vol. I of the Proceedings of the Summit Conference of the Heads of
State and Government held at Adidas Ababa in May 1963, published by
the Provisional Secretariat at Adidas Ababa.
32 Id., sec. 1, at 1-7 (separately paged).
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a small number of nations may closely control protocols, liberal
reservation clauses and optional clauses, and so increase their
confidence in such instruments.
As confidence increases in a regional instrument, the states'
desire to have aliens exhaust its local remedies rule would
decrease. The local remedies rule, which has traditionally re-
quired that the claimant exhaust all local remedies that were
effective, would be modified allowing appeal to a regional body
attuned to state as well as regional problems.
V. THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
One of the first formal efforts to prevent racial discrimina-
tion against minorities like the Ugandan Asians was Article 36
of the text prepared by the Drafting Committee of the Human
Rights Commission.36 It was not a strong text: While it recog-
nized that persons belonging to racial, linguistic and religious
minorities "shall have the right as far as compatible with public
order to establish and maintain their schools and cultural or
religious institutions and to use their language in the Press, in
public assembly and before the Courts and other authorities,"
37
it did not put any obligation on governments to assist such
minorities financially. It also limited protection to a interpre-
tation of public order to be determined by the local authorities.
38
Since then much has been done by the U.N. Subcommission
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
ties. In fact, there has been no issue with which the U.N. has
been more concerned than that of racial discrimination. The
U.N. has made "detailed studies" regarding the existence and
status of recognized minorities in various states and the legis-
lative measures taken by these states for their protection.
39
Still, it was not until the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted
.33 Id.
34 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SU1MMIT CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND
GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, at 32.
: See International Commission of Jurists, African Conference on the Rule
of Law, Lagos, Nigeria (Jan. 3-7, 1961), at 11. Cited in Nanda, Imple-
mentation of Human Rights - Steps Taken by the United Nations and
Regional Organizations, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 307, 332 (1971).
:34; 1947 U.N. Yearbook on Human Rights 499, 502.
:1z Id. Emphasis added.
38 Humphrey, The United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L. L. 872
(1968).
39 Id. at 873.
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that minorities were afforded some substantive protection.40
Article 1(1) provides that
in this Convention the term "racial discrimination" shall mean
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment,
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.
The systematic elimination of all persons of Asian descent from
the Ugandan social, political, cultural and economic experience
clearly comes within this definition. Additionally, the reasons
articulated in Amin's expulsion order suggest a racial basis for
the expulsion, even though such a basis was expressly denied
therein.
41
Within this definition the rights to which prohibition of
discrimination apply are very broad: it covers discrimination
in regard to "human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, social, cultural or any other field of public life. '42 As
Professor Schwelb has noted: "For the practical purposes of
the interpretation of the Convention of 1965 the three terms
'descent', 'national origin' and 'ethnic origin' among them cover
distinctions both on the ground of present or previous 'na-
tionality' in the ethnographical sense and on the ground of
previous nationality in the 'politico-legal' sense of citizenship
(emphasis added) .' 43 Thus, the "nationality" of the Ugandan
Asians does include them within the definitional protection
of this Convention, regardless of their historic entry into Uganda.
Paragraph 2 of Article 1 points out that exclusions of or
restrictions upon aliens qua aliens are not prohibited by the
Convention. The Convention does not necessarily prohibit dis-
tinctions based on whether a person is, or is not, a citizen.
Amin's action has not excluded Ugandan citizens and de facto
appears to have been based on a citizen/non-citizen standard.
However, this interpretation ignores the rationale for expulsion
of the Asians, which was based not on this standard but on
a purely racial distinction which singled out one minority be-
40Annex to General Assembly resolution 2106A (XX), 1406th plenary
meeting, Dec. 21, 1965, General Assembly Official Records: Twentieth
Session. Supplement No. 14 (A/6014) at 47 [hereinafter cited as Annex].
For a complete study of the Convention, see Schwelb, The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
15 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 996 [hereinafter cited as SCHWELB].
41 11 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 1191 (1972). See also 5 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L.
LAW AND POLITICS '603 (1972).
4 ANNEX, supra note 40, at 1103.
43 ANNEX, supra note 40, at 1007.
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cause of its economic wealth. If the former standard had been
used by Amin, all Europeans living in Uganda should have
been treated in the same manner.
Part II of the Convention provides for the use of mechan-
isms for the elimination of racial discrimination and the rights
implicit therein. In particular, the Convention provides for an
international "Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination" (Arts. 8 and 10), for a reporting system in which
State Parties- undertake to cooperate (Art. 9), for interstate
complaints through the Committee and through "ad hoc Con-
ciliation Commissions" (Arts. 11 and 13), for the Committee to
receive individual petitions (Art. 14), and for a sui generis
procedure which will consider parties relating to non-self-gov-
erning territories (Art. 15). Lastly, the Convention provides
for adjudication to the International Court of Justice with re-
spect to interpretation or application of the Convention (Art.
22 of Part III). From this Convention and its ratification, there-
fore, comes the most efficacious means of protecting individuals
in situations like Uganda's. As Professor Schwelb has pointed
out, the Convention is not only the most "comprehensive and
unambiguous codification in treaty form on the equality of
the races."4 4 but it is also the best mechanism for protecting
individual rights now in existence.
VI. STATE RESPONSiBITrY
State Responsibility is the principle in international law
holding that a state is responsible for its conduct and may be
held to account for wrongdoing.45 The need to concen-
trate study on the determination of the principles which govern
the responsibility of states for international protection of hu-
man rights is great, but is too complex a concept to deal with
in depth here.
African states, much like Asian states, are critical of the
customary legal principle of state responsibility:
They believe that such a principle was established against their
basic interests as sovereign states; that it is outmoded since it is
basically a European principle; that aliens should not receive
better or worse treatment than the nationals of a state; that
admission of aliens should be at the complete discretion of the
receiving state alone; and that the receiving state is permitted
absolute discretion in prohibiting or restricting the participation
of aliens in professions and other forms of gainful employrent.46
44 AN-Ex, supra note 40, at 1057.
4.5U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 at 179.
46 C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1971).
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Procedurally, to invoke the theory of state responsibility
against the recent actions of the Ugandan Government, there
must first be shown a violation of international law: "There
can be no question of a State's international responsibility un-
less it can be proved that the State has violated one of the
international obligations incumbent upon States under inter-
national law."'47 Additionally, under international law and apart
from any convention or treaty, to invoke state responsibility,
"it is necessary that an unlawful international act be imputed
to a State, that is, that there exist a violation of a duty im-
posed by an international juridical standard."
48
Since violations of international law in Uganda have been
confirmed both under international convention and under cus-
tomary law, it is necessary to consider what acts perpetrated
there can actually be considered state conduct. Clearly, public
officials acting in their mandated capacity perform duties for
which the highest authority and the state must be responsible.' 9
Hence, the violations herein cited do come within the state
responsibility of Uganda.
VII. CONCLUSION
International protection of individuals in situations like
that of Ugandan Asians has been given effect through the
concept of humanitarian intervention and through formal
documents yet unratified. However, actual protection of indi-
viduals does not exist now, nor appear to exist in the near
future. Only through conventions like the 1965 Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination can
these people come within international jurisdiction. State re-
sponsibility is still a concept, far from being finalized, and
remains dependent on varying interpretations of international
obligations.
What is needed for the future are flexible techniques such
as optional clauses and liberal reservation clauses which can
gradually change relatively minimal obligations into effective
international instruments. How and when these instruments
will come into existence is related to the willingness of the
international community to reassess existing procedures and
to experiment with new ideas.
Randolph John Nogel
47 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, at para. 33.
48 Id. at para. 42.
49 Id. at para. 36. See also 2 Y.B. INT'L. L. COMM'N. 225, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/496, annex 3 (1956).

